Shifting Subjectivity in the Translation of Shinran\u27s Texts by Ama Michihiro
Shifting Subjectivity in the Translation of 
Shinran’s Texts
Ama Michihiro
Introduction
AS Luis Gomez has pointed out, translation of classical Buddhist texts tends to be either theological or philological. In response to the Honganji 
Translation Committee, that translated and compiled The Collected Works of 
Shinran (hereafter CWS), he recommends that such a translation as this, needs 
to be undertaken in ways in which the reader’s imagination is not stripped 
away.1 In his mind, it is important to keep the ambiguities of scholarly Bud­
dhist terms in translation as well, as new interpretations of these are always 
possible.
* This paper was originally prepared for the Classical East Asian Buddhist Texts Workshop 
held from June 30-July 4,2005, which was sponsored by the Department of Religious Studies 
at the University of Oregon in conjunction with the Department of Religion at the University 
of Southern California. The author wishes to express his acknowledgment to those who par­
ticipated in the said workshop, particularly to Professors Mark Unno, Andrew Goble, and Lori 
Meeks who helped develop this presentation into its present format. The author also wishes to 
acknowledge Reverends Peter Lait and Hashimoto Tomoyoshi for their personal discussions 
on the concepts of osd ITfi and gensd iaffl, and Professor Hirota, who provided information 
and insights of which the author was unaware. Lastly, but not least, the author would also like 
to thank the Shinshu Otani-ha (Higashi Honganji) Fellowship for Pure Land Studies for sup­
porting him in his endeavors.
1 Gomez 1983, p. 80.
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The translator’s mission should be to make Shinran’s unique inter­
pretation of scripture available to the English-language reader in an 
idiom that is accessible to him. Modem translations of the terms 
and the texts that Shinran was trying to explicate should reflect, as 
far as possible, the ambiguities, the problems, and the contexts with 
which he had to deal. If he is trying to give a particular definition 
of faith, why should we obscure this fact by rendering the word he 
is grappling with in such a way that we will not have to struggle 
with it?2
2 Ibid., p. 83.
3 Newmark 1981, pp. 12-16.
The difficulty in translation is to what extent translators should include their 
own theological understandings while making literal references, and how to 
maintain the author’s unique philological analysis without generalizing it.
In this paper, I should like to explore contemporary issues and problems 
related to the translation of Shinran’s magnum opus, Kydgydshinshd SfrfiS 
®E, namely the shifting of subjectivity from the absolute to the conventional. 
By focusing on two of his essential concepts, shinjin flbib and eko as taken 
from the CWS, I should like to examine how the Kydgydshinshd and its related 
texts are read in the English language. However, at first, a general approach 
to translation needs to be presented as a backdrop to this Shin Buddhist doc­
trinal discussion.
Categorization of Texts and Methods of Translation
In the study of translation, theorists classify texts into three categories, based 
on their characteristics and correspond to them as such with that particular 
style of translation in mind: (1) literary and authoritative texts are considered 
expressive as the writer makes his/her personal use of the language; (2) sci­
entific and technical texts as informative; and (3) texts which include po­
lemical writings, publicity, propaganda as vocative. When these texts are 
translated, the first group is rendered with an individual style, emphasizing 
the source language with the writer being seen as the first person (such as 
“I”); the second group with a neutral/objective mode underscoring the target 
language with the situation being taken as the third person (such as “it”); and 
the third group with a persuasive or imperative stance, stressing the target lan­
guage, with the reader regarded as the second person (such as “you”).3
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In spite of these differences, two methods of translation can be employed 
to any text, namely communicative and semantic, though these two often 
overlap one another in a single work. However, translators are concerned with 
formality, emotiveness, and simplicity in either case. The communicative 
translation tries to produce the same effect on readers as the source language 
does on those reading the original text, whereas the semantic type attempts to 
convey the exact contextual meaning of the source language through a close 
analysis of both the semantic and syntactic structure of the target language. 
The primary purpose of the former is to communicate and therefore is related 
to speech, whereas that of the latter is to think and so is connected to thought. 
This type of classification often parallels the differences between universalist 
and relativist positions. In approaching expressive texts, communicative 
translation assumes that literalness is possible since the translator has a mes­
sage to convey, even though the difficulty of the translation still remains due 
to either the obscurity of the source language or the lack of equivalent terms 
in the target language itself. Semantic translation, on the contrary, assumes 
that, because communication is often interrupted due to thoughts and feelings 
embedded within the particular culture the writers are raised, messages as 
such cannot be fully conveyed.4
4 Ibid., pp. 21-22, 39,60, 68.
5 Suzuki 1973. Suzuki translated only the first four volumes of the text, and hence did not 
touch those on shinbutsudo H W and keshindo Iblfi.
The Kydgyoshinsho contains all these three dimensions mentioned above. 
The text is expressive as Shinran utters his joy and gratitude, for example, 
when encountering Honen and the Primal Vow; descriptive/informative, 
since Shinran collected passages from various sutras and commentaries so as 
to explain the Primal Vow more effectively; and vocative/persuasive as he 
urges those who read the text, to take refuge in this particular vow. The trans­
lations of the Kyogyoshinshd tend to be semantic as the translators were 
engaged in the thought processes of a relationship between the source lan­
guage and the target one, e.g., whether shinjin is equivalent to faith or not.
Concepts of shinjin and ek5
The Kyogydshinshd has been translated three times, namely by Yamamoto 
Kbsho (1958), whose translation was later incorporated into the Ryukoku 
Translation Series (1966), Suzuki Daisetz (1973),5 and Nishi Honganji 
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(1997).6 There are also two partial translations by Inagaki Saizo (1954) and 
Sugihara Shizutoshi (1957).7 In the previous translations, shinjin is translated 
as “faith,” kept as it is in the CWS, but rendered as “entrusting heart” in the 
most recent edition of A Record in Lament of Divergences: A Translation of 
the Tannishd, (2005), which is also part of the CWS, though published and 
revised separately. Eko itself is translated as “[merit] turning-over” by Suzuki 
and as “directing of virtue” or “directing merit” in the CWS.
6 “The True Teaching, Practice, and Realization of the Pure Land Way” in CWS.
7 Yagi 1985, pp. 29-30.
8 CWS, p. 206.
9 See Kasulis 1981 and Ueda 1981.
10 Ueda 1981, p. 507.
11 Ibid., p. 508.
Shinjin is the most important concept in the Shin Buddhist doctrine. Al­
though it is defined as, “One’s entrusting to Amida’s Primal Vow, which is 
at the same time the negation of one’s calculative thinking, brought about by 
Amida’s working”8 in the “Glossary of Shin Buddhist Terms” in volume two 
of the CWS, shinjin, for the first time, appears as untranslatable in the texts 
themselves. In an exchange between Thomas Kasulis and Yoshifumi Ueda, 
the latter clearly states why the committee of translators chose to keep shin­
jin as it is.9 101In his mind, “The fundamental difference between shinjin and 
faith is that while the concept of faith stands on the duality of God (creator) 
and man (created), shinjin is the oneness ofBuddhaandman, or man’s becom­
ing a buddha”w and “Shinran’s teaching, then, is not one of salvation through 
‘faith,’ for shinjin is not a means to salvation but salvation itself.”11 In other 
words, as one cannot escape the Judeo-Christian preconceptions associated 
with the term “faith,” shinjin becomes untranslatable in English. Since then, 
whether shinjin needs to or actually can be translated or not has remained con­
troversial.
Nevertheless, it seems that this debate was brought to another dimension 
sometime after the publication of the CWS. When publishing Letters of 
Rennyo {Gobunsho (SPY# or Ofumi WY) in 2000, those involved, translated 
shinjin as “entrusting heart.” Also, in the second edition of the English trans­
lation of the Tannishd which I have already mentioned, shinjin is like­
wise rendered as such. In its Preface, the translators’ intention is stated as 
follows:
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As a verb form of shinjin, Shinran used the word tanomu, which 
literally means “to entrust oneself” to something greater than one­
self, to indicate the religious attitude that one maintains in the real­
ization of Amida’s compassion. As a result, we have decided to 
translate shinjin as “entrusting heart,” both in the Letters ofRennyo, 
published in 2000, and now in this second edition of the Tannishd.12
By breaking away from the theological debate about shinjin and faith, the 
group of translators started using a literal translation of the former.
In the Shin Buddhist tradition, shinjin is directed toward sentient beings 
along with nembutsu by the virtues accumulated by Amida Buddha. In the 
causal stage, Bodhisattva Dharmakara made forty-eight vows so as to liberate 
all sentient beings from the wheel of birth-and-death. Upon the fulfillment of 
these and various related practices, he became Amida Buddha. According to 
one of the vows (namely the 18th-the Primal Vow), as long as sentient beings 
call Amida’s Name, one can realize birth in his Pure Land. This takes the form 
of nembutsu or namu-amida-butsu (I take refuge in Amida
Buddha). However, instead of reciting this, Shinran places priority on entrust­
ing oneself to the Primal Vow alone, which Dharmakara made countless ages 
ago. This entrusting is shinjin, which Amida directs (eko) toward sentient 
beings.
When the notion of ekd or “directing of virtue” is rendered into English, 
translation of the concerned passages becomes problematic, as there is an 
absence of an actual subject and the infusion of perspectives of both the ab­
solute and sentient beings (including Shinran himself) in the Kyogyoshinshd. 
However, by investigating the Japanese honorifics existing in the source lan­
guage, which is written in kanbnn (Classical Chinese), Shin Buddhist schol­
ars are able to determine that Shinran is indicating Amida/Dharmakara to be 
the one, who directs these virtues. In the translation itself, however, the sub­
ject is unclear; yet it is possible to infer it as being that of the Bodhisattva, 
practitioner, or even “devotee.” Here below, the original passage describing 
the “directing of virtue” is given in Japanese, followed by the CWS’ transla­
tion:
12 Hongwanji International Center 2005, p. x.
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iSffilT, ^0±lC^DBDT, # 
jwfi • ijEomiaAi/L
—# 1c (A> L iff A L fe A g? v & D ° {emphasis 
added for honorific words) fi
The directing of virtue has two aspects: that for going forth to the 
Pure Land and that for return to this world. “Directing for going 
forth” means to give one’s virtues to all sentient beings and to aspire 
to bring them all to birth in Amida Tathagata’s Pure Land of hap­
piness. “Directing for return to this world” means that after being 
bom in that land, fulfilling samatha and vipasyana, and gaining the 
power of compassionate means, one returns and enters the thick 
forests of birth-and-death, teaches and guides all sentient beings, 
and brings all to enter the Buddha-way together {emphasis added 
for subjects).13 4
13 STzznsJzfi seiten (hereafter SS), p. 233.
14 CWS vol. l,p. 104.
15 “Shinran’s readings.” CWS vol. 2, p. 254.
16 Ibid.
Shinran quotes this passage from T’an-luan’s The Treatise on the Pure Land, 
in which however, “directing for going forth” {oso ekd) was originally read 
as
Do “ ‘Directing forgoing forth’ means to give one’s 
own virtues to all sentient beings and to aspire to be bom together with them 
in that Pure Land of Amida Tathagata.”15 In other words, as the translators 
mention in a note to this translation, “Shinran takes the subject of this pas­
sage on directing virtue to be Dharmakara Bodhisattva, while the original 
speaks of bodhisattvas generally.”16
In the first part of the above describing the “directing for going forth,” 
something in the translation is missing.
In Shinran’s text, onore (lit.“my”) ga kudoku o motte represents the voice of 
Dharmakara, but for the rest of the sentence, the perspective switches to that 
of sentient beings, as the honorific here expresses Shinran’s gratitude to the 
former. The intersection of these two views is lost in translation, partly due 
to the lack of such a stylistic language in English.
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In the second part of these passages, describing the “directing for return to 
this world,” not only is the subject unstated but also the voices of both 
Dharmakara and the sentient beings, who achieve birth in the Pure Land, are 
hardly distinguished in the original text.
Those who are bom in the Pure Land and fulfill samatha and vipasyana are 
sentient beings, and the “one” that returns and guides them is Dharmakara. 
However, in the Kydgyoshinsho, such a demarcation is not as explicit as in 
the translation, in which the subject of this passage is rendered as “one”— 
indicating a conventional subject. The translators’ introduction to the trans­
lation is helpful again as it clarifies the identity of the subject:
Through the working of the Vow, those who realize shinjin will be 
able, after being bom in the Pure Land, to become superior bod­
hisattvas working in this world for the salvation of all beings . . . 
however, Shinran presents it as an expression of Other Power, and 
he interprets the bodhisattva’s return to this world as a reference to 
Dharmakara’s working. In “Chapter on Realization,” it is those 
who have attained birth in the Pure Land that return as bodhisattvas, 
and their working and that of Dharmakara are seen as one.17
17 “Introduction to Teaching, Practice, and Realization.” CWS vol. 2, p. 53.
18 Suzuki 1973, p. 115.
By reading this, it is understood that the subject that “returns and enters the 
thick forests of birth-and-death, teaches and guides all sentient beings, and 
brings all to enter the Buddha-way together” is Dharmakara, united with those 
who have attained birth in the Pure Land. Without consulting this note how­
ever, it is unclear what “one” in the passages of “directing for return to this 
world” represents. In fact, in Suzuki’s translation, the subject of “return” is 
stated as “the devotee.”
The returning [movement] is to come back to this world after having 
been bom in the Pure Land. Having now perfected the practice of 
samatha and vipasyana, and acquired the power of devising various 
means of general salvation for all beings, [the devotee] returns to 
the forest of birth-and-death to teach all beings, so that they will all 
turn toward the way of the Buddha {emphasis added}.18
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When the passages of “directing of virtue”—particularly for “directing for 
return to this world” are translated, the subjectivity shifts from the absolute 
to the conventional. Therefore, in this respect, how are we able to understand 
this change?
Shifting the Subjectivity
Before investigating the significance of this alteration, I should like to explain 
•when “one’s return” takes place and why the concept of the virtue “directing 
for return to this world” is important. Hee-Sung Keel is correct in saying, “It 
is clear that for Shinran the ‘return’ is something that occurs in our next life, 
i.e., after we have attained the Pure Land and enlightenment.”19 Hence, Shin 
Buddhist scholars tend to claim that it is not the conventional subjects, includ­
ing themselves, who gain the power of compassionate means and so help 
others in this world. By asserting that no ethical guidance is found in Shinran’s 
textual understanding of the “directing for return to this world,” Shin 
Buddhist followers have generally remained inactive concerning social 
issues.20
19 Keel 1995, p. 150. Shin Buddhist scholars’ discussion on dsd and genso including their 
application to one’s daily life has varied, even though these two concepts are always treated 
as an inseparable pair derived from Amida’s working. For instance, Soga Ryojin defines dsd 
as the nembutsu through which one attains birth in the Pure Land, and genso as the nembutsu 
expressing one’s gratitude to Amida Buddha, based on one’s obtainment of shinjin (Soga 1947, 
pp. 199—200). According to Kaneko Daiei, dsd is the aspiration for the other woM,paryavasana, 
and the longing for the state in which one transcends one’s own senses and consciousness, 
whereas genso reflects the world of the other shore upon one’s daily life and perceives all phe­
nomena as they are (Kaneko 1952, pp. 60-61).
20 Needless to say, some scholars have challenged such a cliche, namely that Shin Buddhism
lacks ethical responsibility. For instance, Kenneth Tanaka discusses such concerns in Pure 
Land soteriology, based on the doctrine of Jyogyo daihi (constantly practicing great
compassion), which is “more spiritually oriented and more self-reflective than the dominant 
forms of ethical models found in the West.” See Tanaka 1998, p. 100.
21 Kasulis 2001, p. 35.
Recently, American scholars have further developed the understanding of 
“directing of virtue.” For instance, for Thomas Kasulis, the “directing for 
going forth” means “compassion will arise of itself to relieve us from our per­
sonal anguish” and the “directing for return to this world” implies “compas­
sion will arise of itself... to bring us into the world as agents of a compassion 
beyond what I myself can be.”21 By lessening the emphasis on textual analy­
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sis, he tries to observe the dynamics of the virtue “directing for return to this 
world” as follows:
Yet, that tariki [Other Power] is itself compassionate and knows no 
bounds. So its working not only takes the person of shinjin to the 
Pure Land, but also in its expansive response to suffering, com­
passion returns that person to the world of suffering beings and in 
that way the person is a vehicle for Amida’s compassionate agency. 
That is why Shinran could first encounter the Pure Land Way not 
through philosophical analysis or textual scholarship or Tendai prac­
tices, but only through his encounter with Honen. In turn, Shinran’s 
followers encountered it in the person of Shinran. What they really 
encountered was not Shinran’s wisdom or compassion . . . what 
they encountered was instead the working of the Vow through 
Shinran. Shinran’s moral and spiritual agency was not his own 
(jiriki), but that of someone or something else (tarzh').22
22 Ibid., p. 34.
23 Hirota states that the translation emphasized the linguistic function of the text and Pure 
Land Buddhism, rather than an intellectual and ideological understanding of the doctrine. See 
Hirota 1998, p. 265.
24 Hirota 1993b, p. 119.
Kasulis’ interpretation of the text appears to be reasonable, especially when 
the subject of “directing of virtue” is not specified, but rather shown to be 
“one.”
As I stated earlier, shifting the subjectivity from the absolute to the con­
ventional is a phenomenon, which appears in the process of translation. One 
may however ask why the translators did not put the subject as Dharmakara, 
for both “directing for going forth” and “directing for return to this world” if 
this was indicated by Shinran? Such a claim seems plausible. However, if they 
had done so, as Dennis Hirota, head of the CWS translation team might argue, 
they would have prioritized a choice of a theological interpretation over that 
of a philological one, because in the passage of “directing for going forth,” 
the subject appears as onore, not Dharmakara, in the source language.23
Secondly, Hirota points out the features of written Chinese from which 
Shinran draws strength in his reading of the Pure Land texts. One such aspect 
is “the frequent lack of explicit indications of tense and relationships.”24 
Concerning the concepts of “directing of virtue,” Hirota states:
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Even in passages that appear unambiguous in context, Shinran finds 
a latitude unavailable in Japanese for interpretations that deviate 
from the preceding commentarial traditions. One major use of such 
features concerns designations of the agent of action. With the aris­
ing of the doublesided horizon of the self, practicers experience a 
reversal in the direction of the activity that moves them toward 
awakening. To articulate this, Shinran adopted the Mahayana con­
cept of “directing” (eko) merit gained through practice toward 
attainment.25
25 Ibid.
It was the vagueness of expression found in the Ching-t’u lun-chu
(The Commentary on the Treatise on the Pure Land) of T’an-luan i®, in 
which the identity of onore is not clearly stated, that made Shinran construct 
a new interpretation of the subjectivity by making a notation of grammatical 
readings, such as honorific words. To put it differently, it was in the way he 
read the passages that Dharmakara emerged as the subject and for this rea­
son, those passages dealing with “directing of virtue” are expressive in the 
categorization of the texts which I mentioned earlier. Therefore, Shinran was 
able to establish that this “directing” was due to the spontaneous working of 
Dharmakara by reappraising T’an-luan’s passages, in which Dharmakara 
never explicitly appears as the subject, without changing their order or adding 
any kanji characters to them. If, however, Dharmakara or Amida were stated 
directly to be the agent of “directing of virtue” in the translation, there would 
be too much divergence from the source language.
Thirdly, in Shinran’s mind, Dharmakara Bodhisattva and Amida Buddha 
should not be conceived as separate entities, and in fact, in another part of the 
Kydgyoshinsho, Shinran defines the subject of “directing of virtue” as being 
Amida Tathagata.
Finally, “aspire for birth” is the command of the Tathagata’s call­
ing to and summoning the multitudes of all beings. That is, true and 
real entrusting is the essence of aspiration for birth, which is not the 
directing of merit through the self-power of meditative and non- 
meditative practices, whether performed by ordinary people or 
sages of the Mahayana or the Hinayana. Therefore, it is called “not- 
directing.”
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However, sentient beings of the countless worlds, floundering in 
the sea of blind passions and drifting and sinking in the ocean of 
birth-and-death, lack the true and real mind of directing virtues; 
they lack the pure mind of directing virtues. For this reason, when 
the Tathagata was performing bodhisattva practices out of pity for 
the ocean of all sentient beings in pain and affliction, in every sin­
gle moment, every single instant, of his endeavor in the three modes 
of action, he took the mind of directing virtues as foremost, and thus 
realized the mind of great compassion. Accordingly, the Buddha 
directs this other-benefiting, true and real mind of aspiration for 
birth to the ocean of all beings. Aspiration for birth is this mind of 
directing virtues.26
26 CWS, vol. l,pp. 103-4.
The merit of “not-directing” refers to Shinran’s spiritual conviction that it is 
impossible for conventional subjects to transfer the virtue for birth in the Pure 
Land due to their own egotistical concerns. It is the circular movement of 
Dharmakara to Amida and vice versa, in which the merit is directed to all sen­
tient beings. Thus, the subject of “directing of virtue” cannot be limited to 
either Dharmakara or Amida alone.
The alteration of subjectivity, therefore, reflects both theological and 
philological concerns involved in the translation. However, by changing the 
approach, I should like to argue its significance from a different angle. By 
referring to the post-colonial translation discourse when discussing the theory 
of Tathagata’s Three Bodies and the Shin Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths 
(shin zoku nitai absolute and worldly, I should like to investigate
the issue of the changing of subjectivity.
A Search for “New Conceptual Frames ”
For post-colonial theorists, translation needs to be examined in connection 
with the power relationship of a particular culture in which two languages are 
involved. According to Talal Asad, functionalists require a translation to be 
evaluated positively in their own social context, which reflects the residual of 
an absolute claim to enlightened reason. This type of translation is cultural, 
in which institutionalized practices are exercised over less advanced coun­
tries, including the so-called Third World, involving the inequality of lan­
guage, which Asad defines as “a feature of the global patterns of power 
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created by modem imperialism and capitalism.”27 Dipesh Chakrabarty also 
makes a similar argument when discussing the two models of translation, non­
modem and modem. In the former, for instance, the translation of Hindu gods 
into an expression of Islamic divinity is based on local and term-for-term 
exchange in which rhetorical skills, such as alliteration and rhyming, are used. 
In the latter, however, translation tends to be mediated by or referred to as a 
“third category,” in this case, the notion of God in Christianity, so that it 
appears to be “universal.” Chakrabarty calls this type “an act of translation 
modeled on Newtonian science.”28
27 Asad 1993, pp. 172, 199.
28 Chakrabarty 2000, pp. 83-86.
29 Asad 1993, p.190.
30 Maier 1995, p. 31.
As part of the solution to such a cultural translation, which is conditioned 
by professional, national, or international powers, Asad calls for an internal 
critique to be developed in the process of translation.
The good translator does not immediately assume that unusual dif­
ficulty in conveying the sense of an alien discourse denotes a fault 
in the latter, but instead critically examines the normal state of his 
or her own language. The relevant question therefore is not how tol­
erant an attitude the translator ought to display toward the original 
author (an abstract ethical dilemma) but how she can test the toler­
ance of her own language for assuming unaccustomed forms.29
Translation, involving cultural exchange, needs to be self-reflexive, as the 
issues of what is being translated or not as well as for whom the translation 
is being made, reflect the inequality of power.
As the power relationship between the “First” and “Third” Worlds is 
unbalanced, Carol Maier suggests that it is imperative for translators to inquire 
into the connection between subjectivity and identity in the translation itself, 
since it is the “translating subject” that acts between two particular cultures, 
so helping to understand identity as “a learned or constructed allegiance rather 
than an innate condition.”30 For instance, although what is indicated by the 
term “woman” in daily usage is abstract (such as age, appearance, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, and so forth), individuals employ it anyway as a point of 
departure in order to construct both their own and collective identities. In like 
manner, a translator seeks to create “new conceptual frames” in which one 
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culture is introduced to another, by not relying on ready-made formulae avail­
able to either of the two. This is his/her obligation in the field of cross-cul­
tural transliteration, a form of self-critique, by not merely using established 
and unexamined structures.31
31 Ibid.
32 Nagao 1973, p. 38.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the applicability of 
the post-colonial discourse on the translation practice of transliterating clas­
sical Buddhist texts, it is possible to construct a new conceptual frame of 
“one” in the passages of “directing of virtue” if the translating subject is able 
to help shape the spiritual identity of the translator and/or reader who is 
engaged in Shinran’s text. For this, I now turn to the theory of Tathagata’s 
Three Bodies and the Shin Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths.
According to the trikaya theory, Buddha is classified into three bodies: 
dharmakaya (Dharma-body), sambhogakaya (Enjoyment-body/Reward- 
body), and nirmdnakaya (Transformed-body). The first of these three is the 
essence of Buddha’s realization, namely tathata (suchness) or siinyatd 
(emptiness). The second refers to Amida Buddha, who enjoys the Pure Land 
and the Dharma as the consequence of the fulfillment of Bodhisattva 
Dharmakara’s vows and various practices. The third one indicates the phys­
ical Buddha, Sakyamuni, as the manifestation of the Dharma in a historical 
context. Sambhogakaya is also the concretization of the Dharma-body, which 
is also called the nisyandakaya, meaning the outflow of the latter, motivated 
by “great compassion.” Hence, there is a dual function in this Enjoyment­
body—the concretization of the absolute and transcendence of the human 
Buddha—in order to bridge the gap between the first and third bodies. Without 
sambhogakaya, the Dharma that Sakyamuni Buddha had realized, could have 
been seen as merely personal, and if so, after his death, it might have lost its 
legitimacy. In this sense, sambhogakaya “shouldered a temporary meaning 
while being a true reality, and regained its historic nature while transcending 
history.”32
Amida Buddha, thus, has two aspects: the manifestation of the Dharma­
body or formless reality as compassionate means (hoben hosshin 
and the fulfillment of Dharmakara’s vows and practices (hojin $g#). Hirota 
defines these two concepts of Amida as follows:
Amida is seen either as Buddha compassionately emerging from 
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formless reality or as the culmination of aeons of practice to save 
all sentient beings. In fact, it is above all the entire causal narrative 
of Dharmakara-Amida that is the emergence of dharma-body as 
compassionate means, that is, of comprehensible form. At the same 
time, the narrative progresses from the aeons of practice performed 
by Dharmakara toward Amida’s Buddhahood as the formless light 
of wisdom. That is, conversely, the narrative itself moves toward 
attainment of the formless.33
33 Hirota 2001, p. 53. Also, for his detailed discussion of “interfused movements between 
form and formlessness,” see Hirota 1993a, pp. 50-93 and Hirota 1993b, pp. 91-130.
The first current is Amida’s spontaneous action in order to personify itself so 
as to make the narrative available to sentient beings; yet, this anthropomor­
phic aspect of Amida is based on the premise of the second movement in 
which the narrative makes them realize the world of oneness. In this context, 
the alteration of subjectivity in the passages of “directing of virtue” can be 
understood as the agency of Amida/Dharmakara, which makes itself move 
from the absolute to the conventional, so that the reader of the Kyogyoshinshd 
realizes his/her authentic engagement with it. In other words, “one” stands 
for both the dual aspect of this agency and the reader’s active participation at 
the time of reading the text. If this is so, I suggest that the subject “turns into” 
the ordinary from the absolute, as the transformation reflects Amida’s natural 
working.
Nevertheless, changing subjectivity can also indicate the possibility of the 
degradation of Absolute Truth to a worldly one in the doctrine of the Two 
Truths, which has been and continues to be the core of Shin Buddhist teach­
ing, though the concept itself, however, still causes theoretical debates in the 
organization. In the Mahayana tradition, Absolute Truth (Skt. paramartha- 
satya) refers to the ultimate teaching, which transcends mundane affairs, 
while Worldly Truth (Skt. samvrti-satya) corresponds to the rules of this 
world. The relationship between these two often conflicts. In the Shin 
Buddhist tradition, however, this doctrine previously served as the basis for 
the institution in order to formulate its relationship with the state. Perhaps, 
one of the letters of Rennyo, the eighth abbot of Honganji (1415-99), can best 
summarize this point:
In particular, first of all, take the laws of the state as fundamental 
and, giving priority to [the principles of] humanity and justice, fol­
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low the generally accepted customs; deep within yourself, maintain 
the settled mind of our tradition; and outwardly, conduct yourself 
in such a way that the transmission of the dharma you have received 
will not be evident to those of other sects and other schools.34
34 Translated by Rogers (1991, p. 215).
35 SS,p. 398.
36 CWS vol. l,p. 289.
37 Mori 1973, p. 232. See also Rogers 1991, pp. 326-8.
The leaders of both Honganji (Nishi and Higashi) in the Meiji period devel­
oped Rennyo’s ideas in such a way as to justify their participation in the state 
apparatus by propagating to their followers that the basis of the Shin Buddhist 
doctrine was the laws of the state (obo ihon However they went
even further during World War II, by explaining that the duty of Shin 
Buddhists was to die gloriously on the battlefield, and by manipulating the 
Kydgydshinshd so as to avoid possible condemnation from the state over the 
fact that Shinran had criticized the emperor concerning his persecution of the 
nembutsu teaching. In the Postscript to the text, Shinran states:
{shusho shinka), T
Th ®^WL<5EPlc^T, is
OWTAEboTtET, {emphasis added)35
The emperor and his ministers, acting against the dharma and vio­
lating human rectitude, became enraged and embittered. As a result, 
Master Genku—the eminent founder who had enabled the true 
essence of the Pure Land way to spread vigorously [in Japan]—and 
a number of his followers, without receiving any deliberation of 
their [alleged] crimes, were summarily sentenced to death or were 
dispossessed of their monkhood, given [secular] names, and con­
signed to distant banishment. I was among the latter. Hence, I am 
now neither a monk nor one in worldly life. For this reason, I have 
taken the term Toku [“stubble-haired”] as my name.36 37
Either by deleting the two characters of shusho (emperor) or placing the 
preposition no (of) between shusho and shinka, Shin Buddhist leaders could 
claim that it was not the emperor, himself, but his ministers who had been 
responsible for suppressing Honen’s Nembutsu Sangha3'1
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The manipulation of the text mentioned above is extreme, but when the 
translation is taken at face value, it is possible to interpret the subject that 
transfers the merit as an ordinary being, in the same way as Suzuki inserted 
“the devotee” into the passages concerning “directing for return to this 
world.” In the light of such a reading, the action of one who “teaches and 
guides all sentient beings” is justified as he/she receives shinjin, even though 
such an action is often connected with one’s egotistical desires. In other 
words, by separating the “directing for going forth” from that of “directing 
for return to this world,” shinjin becomes something to be gained after which, 
one is able to carry out the mission to save the world. Amida’s Primal Vow 
is now replaced with justice, which is asserted by the human ego.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate one of the ambiguities observed 
in the translation of Shinran’s passages of “directing of virtue.” The shifting 
of the subjectivity from the absolute to the conventional cannot be dismissed 
simply as a problem of linguistic differences. Instead, by creating new con­
ceptual frames—dynamic movements of form and formlessness, in which 
Amida/Dharmakara’s agency is involved, and by reducing the absolute sub­
ject to a colloquial language—I have tried to preserve the untranslatability of 
a yet completely new transliteral interpretation of the dual concept of osd- 
gensd.
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